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Abstract
To scrutinize notions of computation and time complexity, we introduce and formally de-
fine an interactive model for computation that we call it the computation environment.
A computation environment consists of two main parts: i) a universal processor and
ii) a computist who uses the computability power of the universal processor to perform
effective procedures. The notion of computation finds it meaning, for the computist,
through his interaction with the universal processor.
We are interested in those computation environments which can be considered as al-
ternative for the real computation environment that the human being is its computist.
These computation environments must have two properties: 1- being physically plausi-
ble, and 2- being enough powerful.
Based on Copeland’ criteria for effective procedures, we define what a physically plausible
computation environment is.
By being enough powerful, we mean that the universal processor of the computation
environment, must be in a way that the computist can carry out (via the universal
processor) all logical deductions that the human being can carry out.
We construct two physically plausible and enough powerful computation environments:
1- the Turing computation environment, denoted by ET , and 2- a persistently evolution-
ary computation environment, denoted by Ee, which persistently evolve in the course
of executing the computations.
We prove that the equality of complexity classes P and NP in the computation envi-
ronment Ee conflicts with the free will of the computist.
We provide an axiomatic system T for Turing computability and prove that ignoring
just one of the axiom of T , it would not be possible to derive P = NP from the rest of
axioms.
We prove that the computist who lives inside the environment ET , can never be confi-
dent that whether he lives in a static environment or a persistently evolutionary one.
1 Introduction
We distinguish between the syntax and semantics of Turing machines (following D. Goldin,
and P. Wegner, see 5.2, of [16]), and scrutinize what the computation is from an interactive
view. We study the computation as a result of interaction between a computist and a
computer. To do this, We propose a notion called the ‘computation environment’, as an
interactive model for computation which regards the computation as an interaction between
1It is the first draft of the article. The English language is not yet perfect. This article is the first paper
of some serial related articles which would be appeared later.
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the human being as a computist and a processor unit called the universal processor. In this
way, Turing machines (which are proposed by Turing as a model of computation) would find
their meanings based on the interaction of the human being and the universal processor.
A computation environment would consist of two parts: 1- a universal processor unit
and 2- a computist who uses the universal processor to perform computation.
Based on Copeland’s Criteria for effective procedures, we define physical plausibility as
a property for computation environments, and attempt to construct computation environ-
ments which could be taken as alternatives for the computation environment of the real
world. That is, we are interested in those computation environments that are physically
plausible and if the human being lives in one of them then the computability power of the
environment enables him to carry out logical deductions.
The famous problem P versus NP is a major difficult problem in computational complex-
ity theory, and it is shown that lots of certain techniques (such as diagonalization arguments
and relativization which are used to show that one complexity class differs from another one)
are failed to answer to this problem (see [27, 1, 2]). However, for some hypercomputations
(see appendix 9.1), it is proved that P 6= NP.
Hypercomputation extends the capabilities of the Turing computation via using new
resources such as 1) oracle information sources 2) infinite specification, 3) infinite com-
putation and 4) the interaction (see the appendix 9.2). Among these four resources, the
resources 1,2, and 3 do not seem physically plausible as they have infinite structures. But
the forth one, the interaction, seems physically plausible.
It is proved for hypercomputation models which use the resources as oracle information,
and infinite computation, P is not equal to NP.
Oracle information source: an oracle machine is a Truing machine equipped with an
oracle that is capable of answering questions about the membership of a specific set.
It can be shown that P 6= NP for oracle Turing machines considering a specific oracle
set (see page 74, of [5]).
Infinite computation: it is shown that P 6= NP for infinite time Turing machine [29].
Infinite time Turing machines are a natural extension of Turing machines to transfinite
ordinal times, and the machine would be able to operate for transfinite number of
steps [20].
In this paper, we aim to study the famous problem P vs NP considering the interaction
resource. We introduce a new kind of Hypercomputation called persistently evolutionary
Turing machine. A persistently evolutionary Turing machine is a Turing machine that its
inner structure may persistently evolve during the computation. Persistently evolution-
ary Turing machines can be considered as a model of interactive computation [17] and
should be compared with Persistent Turing machines independently introduced by Goldin
and Wegner [18] and Kosub [21]. We are not going to prove that P 6= NP for persistently
evolutionary Turing machines similar to what is proved about infinite time Turing ma-
chines in [29]. Instead, we take advantage of persistently evolutionary Turing machines
and construct a computation environment Ee which its universal processor is a persistently
evolutionary Turing machine, and in this environment P is not equal to NP. In this way,
we present an interactive semantics for Turing machines and we prove P is not equal to
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NP taking this semantics. Our work should be considered in the literature of interactive
computation [17] which is a new paradigm of computation.
We construct a computation environment that we call it Turing computation environ-
ment ET . We prove that the computationally complexity classes P and NP of this envi-
ronment are exactly the same complexity classes P and NP for Turing computation. We
prove that the computist who lives inside the environment ET can never be confident that
whether he lives inside a static environment or a persistently evolutionary one.
The paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2, we briefly review the definition of Turing computation and time com-
plexity, and ask some questions which their answers inspire us to distinguish between
syntax and semantics of Turing machine.
In Section 3, we define formally what a computation environment is, and we introduce
the Turing computation environment that the notions of computability and time com-
plexity in this environment are exactly as the same as they are for Turing machines.
In Section 4, a kind of hypercomputations called persistently evolutionary Turing
machines are introduced. Persistently evolutionary Turing machines are interactive
machines, and it is shown that they are as physically plausible as Turing machines
are.
In Section 5, a persistently evolutionary computation environment is introduced and
proved that the equality of two complexity classes P and NP, in this environment,
conflicts with the free will of the computist.
In Section 6, we provide an axiomatic system T for Turing computation, and it is
shown that ignoring one of the axioms of T , it is not possible to derive P = NP from
the rest of axioms.
2 Semantics vs. Syntax
In this section, we briefly review the standard definition of Turing machines and time
complexity in the literature. Then we ask and answer a question about who means and
executes a Turing machine.
Definition 2.1 A Turing machine T is a tuple T = (Q,Σ,Γ, q0, δ), where Q is a finite set
of states containing two special states q0 (initial state) and h (halting state). Σ and Γ are
two finite sets, input and work tape alphabets, respectively, with Σ ⊆ Γ and Γ has a symbol
△ ∈ Γ − Σ, the blank symbol. δ : (Q − {h}) × Γ → Q × Γ × {R,L} is a partial function
called the transition function.
- A configuration of a Turing machine T is any symbolic form (q, xay) where q ∈ Q,
x, y ∈ Γ∗, and a ∈ Γ.
- A configuration C is a successful configuration whenever C = (h, x△) or C = (h,△x).
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- A computation path of a Turing machine T on a string x is any finite sequence
C0C1...Cn of configuration which is started with C0 = (q0,△x) and each Ci+1 is
obtained from Ci by applying the transition function δ.
- We say a Turing machine T accepts a string x, if there is a computation path C0C1...Cn,
for some n ∈ N, where C0 = (q0,△x), and Cn is a successful configuration. We define
L(T ) ⊆ Σ∗ to be the set of all strings accepted by T .
- The time complexity of computing T on x, denoted by timeT (x), is the number of
configurations which appears in the computation path C0C1...Cn, for some n ∈ N,
where C0 = (q0,△x), and Cn is a successful configuration.
Definition 2.2 Let f : N→ N and L ⊆ Σ∗. We say the time complexity of the computation
of the language L is less than f whenever there exists a Turing machine T such that L(T ) =
L, and for all x ∈ L, timeT (x) < f(|x|).
Definition 2.3 The computational complexity class P ⊆ 2Σ
∗
is defined to be the set of all
languages that their time complexity is less than a polynomial function. We also define the
complexity class NP ⊆ 2Σ
∗
as follows:
L ∈ NP iff there exists J ∈ P and a polynomial function q such that for all x ∈ Σ∗,
x ∈ L⇔ ∃y ∈ Σ∗(|y| ≤ q(|x|) ∧ (x, y) ∈ J).
We start by asking and answering some questions, and inspired by the questions, we
propose the notion of computation environment.
Question 2.4 Who executes and means the computation?
If we ask you who executes an algorithm written in a computer programming language,
say C++, you may simply answer that the CPU (central processor unit) of the computer.
Now we ask who executes the computation in the real world?
Consider the Turing machine
p T = (Q,Σ,Γ, q0, δ), where
Q = {q0, q1, h}, Σ = {0, 1}, Γ = {0, 1,△},
δ = {(q0,△)֌ (q1,△, R), (q1, 0)֌ (q1, 1, R), (q1, 1)֌ (q2, 1, L), (q2, 0)֌ (h, 0, l)} q.
• Who means the string of alphabets written between p q in above?
Consider a configuration C = (q1,△001101△),
• who means and executes the transition function δ on the configuration C, and provides
the configuration C ′ = (q2,△001101△)?
Turing describes an effective procedure as one that could be performed by an infinitely
patient ideal mathematician working with an unlimited supply of paper and pencils [25].
Therefore, Turing knows a Turing machine as one that is carried out by the human being
We may answer above questions in two different ways based on what kind of entity one
may assumes a computing machine is:
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1- it is a mental and subjective entity that the human being means it, and the brain of
the human being as a universal processor executes it, or
2- it is a mechanical entity that the nature as a universal processor executes it and the
human being is an observer of this execution.
In the first view, assuming a Turing machine T and an arbitrary string x ∈ Σ∗, it is the
brain of the human being (as a universal processor) who applies the machine T on input
x. If a Turing machine T and a string x are given to the human being, then he applies
T on x having an unlimited supply of paper and pencils. He counts the number of times
that he moves his pencil to left or right as the time complexity that he consumes on this
computation. The human being does not have access to the brain, and ignores the amount
of mental processes that happens inside it. Time complexity is defined to be the number of
pencil moves not the amount of mental processes.
In the second view, given a Turing machine M and an arbitrary string x ∈ Σ∗, it is the
nature (as a universal processor) who executes the machine T on input x. The human being
just is a computist who knows what a Turning machine is and sees that the nature behaves
well defined, that is, the computist cannot observe any differences between two execution
of T on x0 that the nature may complete in different periods of time. Note that the nature,
in order to perform one transition of a Turing machine T on a string x, may need to do
lots of mechanical processes that could be invisible for the computist, and the computist
ignores them and he does not count them as the time complexity.
The reason that the human knows the Church-Turing statement to be a thesis, is that
the resource which executes effective procedures is a black for him. The human being takes
the resource of computation (the brain or the nature) as a black box, and does not consider
the inner structure and the internal action of the resource, in formalizing the notions of
computability and time complexity.
By above arguments, we do not consider Turing machines as autonomous and independent
entities. They are subject to a universal processor that could be the human’s brain or the
nature. Nobody can build a Turing machine in the outer world, since a Turing machine has
an infinite tape! However, if we consider Turing machines as instruction sets for a universal
processor, then they find their meanings. In this way, we differ between semantics and
syntax of Turing machines, following D. Goldin and P. Wegner (5.2 of [16]):
Statements about TM (Turing Machines) expressiveness, such as the Church-
Turing Thesis, fundamentally depend on their semantics. If these semantics
were defined differently, it may (or may not) produce an equivalent machine.
Kugel uses the terms machinery and machines to describe the same distinction
between what a machine contains and how it is used (Kugel, 2002). He points
out that if used differently, the same machinery results in a different machine.
An example of a model that shares TMs syntax (machinery) but has different
semantics are Persistent Turing Machines; its semantics are based on dynamic
streams and persistence. (page 19 of [16])
There are lots of formalization of the notion of computation, like Church λ calculus,
Turing machines, and Markov algorithms and etc (see, Chapter 8 of [15]). What all for-
malization for computation have in common is that they are purely syntactical. Mostowski
says (see page 70 of [15]):
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However much we would like to “mathematize” the definition of computability,
we can never get completely rid of the semantics aspects of this concept. The
process of computation is a linguistic notion (presupposing that our notion of
language is sufficiently general); what we have to do is to delimit a class of
those functions (considered as abstract mathematical objects) for which there
exists a corresponding linguistic object (a process of computation). [Mostowski,
p.35]
Therefore, it seems reasonable that we distinguish between semantics and syntax of a
Turing machine, and propose different semantics for it. In this way, for a Turing machine,
we face with two things:
1) the syntax: what does a Turing machine consist of?, and
2) the semantics: how is a Turing machine executed?
The syntax of a Turing machine is a finite set of basic transitions coded in a finite string, and
its semantics prescribes that how a the computation starts from a configuration, transits to
other configurations and finally stops.
In this paper, we propose computation environments to present an interactive semantics
for Turing machines. We prove that regarding this semantics P is not equal to NP.
The computation environment would have two parts:
1- a universal processor which means and executes the syntax of computation through
interaction with a computist, and
2- a computist who ignores the inner structure and the internal actions of the universal
processor in formalizing the notion of computability and time complexity.
Definition 2.5 An instruction-set of a processor is a finite set of its instructions. An
instruction (a command) is a single operation of a processor that the processor interacts via
it with its outer.
Note that instructions differ from the internal actions that a processor may execute to
perform one of its instruction. Instructions are assumed to be atomic statements that make
it possible for a user to communicate (interact) with the processor.
The universal processor (nature, or brain of the computist) executes the computation
of an instruction-set M on an input string x.
Assuming the human being as a computist of the computation environment of the real
world, we may say
i- Turing machines are finite instruction-sets of the universal processor of the real world,
and
ii- if the human being can effectively compute a function f then there exists a code of a
Turing machine as an instruction-set of the universal processor such that the human
being can communicate through the code with the universal processor to compute the
function.
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3 Computation Environments
As it is mentioned in introduction, we divide a computation environment to two main parts:
1) a universal processor, and 2) a computist. In this section, we provide a formal definitions
for computation environments.
In the following of the paper, we may use two terms ‘the observer’ of an environment
and ‘the god’ of an environment.
• An observer of an environment is an ideal mathematician who does not have access
to the inner structure of the universal processor.
• A god of an environment is an ideal mathematician who has access to the inner
structure of the universal processor.
We start some propositions and theorems by symbol GV to declare that they are proved by
the ideal mathematician who has access to the inner structure of the universal processor.
Definition 3.1 A universal processor is a tuple U = (TBOX,SBOX, INST,CONF ),
where
1. INST is a nonempty set (assumed to be the set of all instructions of the univer-
sal processor), and INST0 ⊆ INST is a nonempty subset called the set of starting
instructions.
2. CONF is a nonempty set called the set of configurations such that to each x ∈ Σ∗,
a unique configuration C0,x ∈ CONF is associated as the start configuration, and to
each C ∈ CONF , a unique string yC ∈ Σ
∗ is associated.
Two sets INST and CONF consist the programming language of the universal processor
that via them a computist communicates with the processor.
3. TBOX (the transition black box) is a total function from CONF×INST to CONF∪
{⊥},
4. SBOX (the successful black box) is a total function from CONF to {Y ES,NO},
The two boxes TBOX and SBOX are processor units of the universal processor.
Definition 3.2
i. A syntax-procedure is a finite set M ⊆ INST (a finite set of instructions), satisfying
the following condition (called the determination condition): for every C ∈ CONF
either for all ι ∈M , TBOX(C, ι) = ⊥, or at most there exists one instruction τ ∈M
such that TBOX(C, ι) ∈ CONF . We refer to the set of all syntax-procedures by the
symbol Ξ.
ii. We let υ : Ξ × CONF → INST ∪ {⊥} be a total function such that for each
syntax-procedure M and C ∈ CONF , if υ(M,C) ∈ INST then υ(M,C) ∈ M , and
TBOX(C, υ(M,C)) ∈ CONF .
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Definition 3.3 A computation environment is a pair E = (U,O) where U is a universal
processor and O is a computist which satisfy the following conditions:
c1. The computist O just observes the input-output behavior of two black boxes of the
universal processor, and ignores internal actions of the universal processor (similar to
what the human being does in formalizing notions of computation and time complexity)
c2. The computist O has a free will to do the following things in any order that he wants:
1− he can freely choose an arbitrary instruction ι ∈ INST and an arbitrary config-
uration C ∈ CONF to apply the TBOX on (C, ι), and
2− he can freely choose an arbitrary configuration C ∈ CONF to apply the SBOX
on. 2
c3. The computist O effectively defines (effectively intends) a string x ∈ Σ∗ to be in the
language of a syntax-procedure M , whenever he can construct a sequence C0C1, ..., Cn
of configurations in CONF such that
– C0 = C0,x,
– each Ci, i ≥ 1, is obtained by applying TBOX on (Ci−1, υ(M,Ci−1)),
– the SBOX outputs Y ES for Cn,
– and either υ(M,Cn) = ⊥ or TBOX(Cn, υ(M,Cn)) = ⊥.
The computist O calls C0C1, ..., Cn the successful computation path of M on x. The
length of a computation path is the number of configurations appeared in. We refer
to the language of a syntax-procedure M , by L(M). Note that the language L(M) is
dependent to the computist and is the set of all strings, say x, that the computist O,
in his living in the computation environment, can construct a successful computation
path of M for them.
c4. The computist O effectively defines (effectively intends) a partial function f : Σ∗ → Σ∗
through a syntax-procedure M ∈ Ξ, whenever for x ∈ Σ∗, he can construct a sequence
C0C1, ..., Cn of configurations in CONF such that
– C0 = C0,x,
– each Ci, i ≥ 1, is obtained by applying TBOX on (Ci−1, υ(M,Ci−1)),
– the SBOX outputs Y ES for Cn,
– and either υ(M,Cn) = ⊥ or TBOX(Cn, υ(M,Cn)) = ⊥,
– yCn = f(x).
c5. The semantics of a syntax-procedure M ∈ Ξ (the way it is executed in the environment)
is determined through the interaction of the computist with the universal processor.
2 By the term free will, we mean there is no syntax-procedure M1 that can simulate the behavior of the
computist O, that is, there is no syntax-procedure M1 that can recognize the ordering that the computist O
inputs strings to the universal processor U . Or in other words, the order that the computist chooses strings
to input to the universal processor need not to be predetermined.
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c6. The computist may start to apply the universal processor U on a syntax-procedure
M and a string x, however he does not have to keep on the computation until the
successful box outputs Y es. The computist can leave the computation M on x at any
stage of his activity and choose freely any other syntax-procedure M ′ and any other
string x′ to apply U on them.
c7. The computist O defines the time complexity of computing a syntax-procedure M
on an input string x, denoted by timeM (x), to be n, for some n ∈ N, whenever he
constructs a successful computation path of the syntax-procedure M on x with length
n.
c8. The inner structure of the black boxes of the universal processor may evolve through
their inner processes on inputs, however they have to behave well-defined through time,
and the computist cannot realize the evolution, because he does not have access to the
inner part of the universal processor.
c9. Let f : N → N and L ⊆ Σ∗. The computist says that the time complexity of the
computation of the language L in the computation environment E, is less than f
whenever there exists a syntax-procedure M ∈ Ξ such that the language defined by the
computist via M , i.e., L(M), is equal to L, and for all x ∈ L, timeM (x) < f(|x|).
c10. The computist defines the time complexity class PE ⊆ 2
Σ∗ to be the set of all languages
that he can effectively define in polynomial time. He also defines the complexity class
NPE ⊆ 2
Σ∗ as follows:
L ∈ NPE iff there exists J ∈ PE and a polynomial function q such that for all
x ∈ Σ∗,
x ∈ L⇔ ∃y ∈ Σ∗(|y| ≤ q(|x|) ∧ (x, y) ∈ J).
c11. Logical Deduction. We say a computation environment is enough powerful when-
ever the computist can carry out logical deduction using the universal processor.
By definition of computation environments, we attempt to mathematically model the
situation that the human being has with the notion of computation in the real world. In a
computation environment,
a language L (a function f) is effectively calculable if and only if there exists
a syntax-procedure M ∈ Ξ such that the computist can define the language L
(the function f) through it.
In this way, the syntax-procedures find their meaning via the interaction of the computist
with the universal processor of the environment.
Example 3.4 (The Turing Computation Environment).
Let QT = {h}∪{qi | i ∈ N∪{0}}, Σ,Γ be two finite set with Σ ⊆ Γ and Γ has a symbol
△ ∈ Γ− Σ.
The universal processor Us = (TBOXs, SBOXs, INSTs, CONFs) is defined as follows:
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1) INSTs = {[(q, a)→ (p, b,D)] | p, q ∈ QT , a, b ∈ Γ,D ∈ {R,L}},
(INSTs)0 = {[(q, a)→ (p, b,D)] ∈ INSTs | q = q0}, and
2) CONFs = {(q, xaz) | q ∈ QT , x, z ∈ Γ
∗, a ∈ Γ}, for each x ∈ Σ∗, C0,x = (q0,△x), and
for each C = (q, xaz) ∈ CONFs, yC = xaz.
Note that the programming language of Us is exactly the standard syntax of configurations
and transition functions of Turing machines.
3) Let C = (q, xb1ab2y) be an arbitrary configuration then
– TBOXs(C, [(q, a) → (p, c,R)]) is defined to be C
′ = (p, xb1cb2y),
– TBOXs(C, [(q, a) → (p, c, L)]) is defined to be C
′ = (p, xb1cb2y), and
– for other cases TBOXs is defined to be ⊥.
4- Let C ∈ CONFs be arbitrary
– if C = (h,△x) then SBOXs(C) is defined to be Y ES,
– if C = (h, x△) then SBOXs(C) is defined to be Y ES, and
– otherwise SBOXs(C) is defined to be NO.
5- For each M ∈ Ξs, and C = (q, xay) ∈ CONFs, if there exists [(q, a)→ (p, b,D)] ∈M
for some p ∈ QT , b ∈ Γ, and D ∈ {R,L}, then υ(M,C) is defined to be [(q, a) →
(p, b,D)] else it is defined to be ⊥.
We call the computation environment ET = (Us, Of ) (where Of is a computist with the
free will) the Turing Computation Environment.
Note that each syntax-procedure M ∈ Ξs of the Turing computation environment ET is
exactly a transition function of a Turing machine. Let TM = {T = (Q,Σ,Γ, q0, δ) | Q ⊆
QT } be the set of all Turing machines (according to definition 2.1) that the set of their
states is a finite subset of QT . Define two functions F1 : TM → Ξs and F2 : Ξs → TM as
follows:
• for each T ∈ TM , F1(T ) = δ,
• for each M ∈ Ξs, F2(M) = (Q,Σ,Γ, q0,M), where Q is the set of all states in QT
which appeared in the instructions of M .
One may easily prove that, for all T ∈ TM , if the human being computes L(T ) in the real
world, and the computist Of computes L(F1(T )) in the Turing computation environment
ET then L(T ) = L(F1(T )).
Also, for all M ∈ Ξs, if the computist Of computes L(M) in the Turing computation
environment ET , and the human being computes F2(M) in the real world then L(M) =
L(F2(M)).
Theorem 3.5 (GV).
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1- For each syntax-procedure M ∈ Ξs, there exists a Turing machine T = F2(M) such
that for every x ∈ Σ∗, x ∈ L(M) and timeM (x) = n iff x ∈ L(T ) and timeT (x) = n.
2- For each Turing machine T , there exists a syntax-procedure M ∈ Ξs, M = F1(T ), such
that for every x ∈ Σ∗, x ∈ L(T ) and timeT (x) = n iff x ∈ L(M) and timeM (x) = n.
Proof. It is straightforward.⊣
The above theorem is true from the god’s view. The computist who lives inside the
environment cannot prove the above theorem as he does not have access to the inner struc-
ture of the universal processor Us. However he is always free to propose a hypothesis about
its computation environment like Church and Turing did. Note that since we (the human
beings) do not have access to the inner structure of our mind, we call the Church Turing
statement to be a thesis. If we know that how effective procedures are executed by our
mind, then we should not call the Church Turing statement to be a thesis.
Corollary 3.6 (GV). The time complexity classes in the Turing computation environment
are exactly the same classes of Turing machines. Particulary,
1- PET = P, and
2- NPET = NP.
Definition 3.7 A universal processor U = (TBOX,SBOX, INST,CONF ) is called to be
static, whenever the inner structure of two boxes TBOX and SBOX does not change due
to interaction with the computist. It is called persistently evolutionary whenever the the
inner structure of at least one boxes changes but persistently, i.e., in the way that the boxes
work well-defined.
The universal processor of the Turing computation environment defined in the example 3.4
is static, in Section 5, We introduce a computation environment which universal processor
persistently evolve.
We may construct lots of computation environments. But we are interested in those
computation environments that are
• physically plausible
• enough powerful,
and thus could be considered as alternatives of the computation environment of the real
world.
By enough powerful, we mean that the computability power of the universal processor
must be enough high such that the the computist who lives in the environment can carry
out all deductions in first order logic that the ideal mathematician can carry out in the real
world.
Note that if a theory T in the first order logic is recursively enumerable then the set of
all statements that could be logically derived from the theory is also recursively enumerable,
that is, deduction is Turing computable. Hence, We consider the following definition.
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Definition 3.8 A computation environment E = (U,O) is enough powerful, whenever for
every recursively enumerable language L, there exists a syntax-procedure M in the environ-
ment that the computist can define L through M , i.e., L(M) = L.
Proposition 3.9 The Turing computation environment ET is enough powerful.
Proof. It is straightforward. ⊣
By physical plausibility, we mean the inner structures of the black boxes have to be as
physically plausible as a Turing machine is. Copeland gives four criteria that any set of
instructions that makes up a procedure should satisfy in order to be characterized as an
effective procedure (see the Church-Turing Thesis, Chapter 2, Page 21, [31]):
1) Each instruction is expressed by a finite string of Alphabet, that is the elements of
INST must be definable by finite strings.
2) The instructions are basic and produce the result in one step (or at most in a finite
number of steps).
3) They can be carried out by the computist (the human being) unaided by any machin-
ery, ignoring the internal actions of the universal processor (his mind).
4) They demand no insight on the part of the computist carrying it out (the computist
just simply inputs an instruction and a configuration in the transition box, and receives
the next configuration. No insight is needed).
Also a procedure has to be finite, definite (each instruction must be clear and unam-
biguous), and effective (every instruction (like [(p, a) ֌ (q, b,R)]) has to be sufficiently
basic) 3.
Inspired by Copeland’s criteria, we define physical plausibility for computation environ-
ments.
Definition 3.10 A computation environment E = (U,O), where U = (TBOX,SBOX, INST,CONF )
is physically plausible whenever
a1. The inner structure of two black boxes TBOX and SBOX are as physically plausible
as the human being knows the Turing machines are.
a2. The instructions in INST can be described in finite words,
a3. The configurations in CONF can be described in finite words.
Corollary 3.11 Every computation environment E = (U = (TBOX,SBOX, INST,CONF ), O)
which
1. INST = INSTs,
2. CONF = CONFs (see the definition of ET in example 3.4),
3See the definition of algorithm presented in page 21, [31] which is accepted by most computer scientist
and engineers
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3. and the inner structure of TBOX and SBOX are physically plausible machines,
is physically plausible.
Proof. Since the instructions in INSTs and configurations in CONFs are describable in
finite strings, the items a2, and a3 of definition 3.10 is fulfilled. ⊣
Question 3.12 Is there a physically plausible and enough powerful computation environ-
ment E such that PE is not equal to NPE for the computist who uses the universal processor
freely?
In the next section, we introduce persistently evolutionary Turing machines as a kind of
hypercomputations. Then in a sequel, based on this hypercomputation, we construct a phys-
ically plausible computation environment that the successful box of its universal processor
is a persistently evolutionary Turing machine, and P is not equal to NP in the environment.
4 Persistently Evolutionary Turing Machines
The notion of being constructive in Brouwer’s intuitionism goes beyond the Church-Turing
thesis (see the appendix 9.2). In this section, inspired by Brouwer’s choice sequences, we
introduce persistently evolutionary Turing machines. A persistently evolutionary Turing
machine is a machine that its inner structure during its computation on any input may
evolve 4. But this evolution is in the way that if a computist does not have access to the
inner structure of the machine then he cannot recognize whether the machine evolves or
not.
Definition 4.1 Let M1 and M2 be two (deterministic) Turing machines, and x ∈ Σ
∗ be
arbitrary. We say M1 and M2 are x-equivalent, denoted by M1 ≡x M2 whenever
if one of the two machines M1 and M2 outputs y for input x, then the other one also
outputs the same y for the same input x.
Definition 4.2 A Persistently evolutionary Turing machine is a couple N = (〈z0, z1, ..., zi〉, f)
where 〈z0, z1, ..., zi〉 is a growing sequence of codes of deterministic Turing machines, and f
(called the persistently evolutionary function) is a computable partial function from Σ∗×Σ∗
to Σ∗ such that for any code of a Turing machine, say y, and any string x ∈ Σ∗, if y halts
on x then f(y, x) is defined and it is a code of a new Turing machine. The function f
satisfies the following condition (that we call it the persistent condition):
- for every finite sequence (x1, x2, ..., xn, xn+1) of Σ
∗, and every Turing machine y0, if
y1 = f(y0, x1), y2 = f(y1, x2),..., yn = f(yn−1, xn) and yn+1 = f(yn, xn+1) are defined
then we have for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, yn+1 ≡xi+1 yi.
4Similar computing machines (dynamic machines) were presented in the author’s PhD thesis [26].
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Whenever an input x is given to N , the output of the evolutionary machine N is computed
according to the zi (z1 = f(z0, x1), z2 = f(z1, x2),... zi = f(zi−1, xi), where x1, x2, ..., xi are
strings that sequentially have given as inputs to N until now, and N has halted for all of
them), and the machine evolves to N = (〈z0, z1, ..., zi, zi+1 = f(zi, x)〉, f) (if zi halts for x).
Note that since the evolution happens persistently, as soon as N provides an output for an
input x, if we will input the same x to N again in future, then N provides the same output
as before. It says that, the machine N behaves well-defined as an input-output black box.
The persistently evolutionary Turing computation could be assumed as one of forms of
Hypercomputation [24, 31]. Note that at each moment of time, a persistently evolutionary
Turing machine has a finite structure, but during computations on inputs, its structure
may change. So it is not possible to encode a persistently evolutionary Turing machine in
a finite word. A persistently evolutionary Turing machine is an interactive machine (see
Chapter 5 of [31], and [17]) that evolves according to how it interacts with its users. One may
compare persistently evolutionary Turing machines with persistent Turing machines (PTM).
The difference between these two kinds of machines is that PTM’s are static machines that
transform input streams (infinite sequence of strings) to output streams persistently [19,
18, 21], whereas persistently evolutionary Turing machines are evolutionary machines that
transform input strings to output strings.
We may start with two equal persistently evolutionary Turing machines N1 = (z0, f)
and N2 = (z
′
0, f
′) where z0 = z
′
0 and f = f
′, but as we input strings to two machines in
different orders the machines may evolve in different ways.
Example 4.3 Let z0 be a code of an arbitrary Turing machine, and I : Σ
∗ → Σ∗ be the
identity function, I(x) = x for all x ∈ Σ∗. Then N = (z0, I) is a persistently evolutionary
Turing machine. Thus any Turing machine can be considered as a persistently evolutionary
Turing machine.
Fact 4.4 A user who just has access to the input-output behavior of an evolutionary Turing
machine N , cannot become conscious whether the machine N evolves or not. In other words,
if we put a persistently evolutionary machine in a black box, a computist can never be aware
that whether it is a (static) Turing machine in the black box, or a persistently evolutionary
one.
Corollary 4.5 Let E = (U,O) be a computation environment that the computist O does
not have access to the inner structure of the processor U . The computist O can never be
aware that whether its environment persistently evolves or not.
In the next example, we let NFA1 be the class of all nondeterministic finite automata
that for each M ∈ NFA1, each state q of M , and a ∈ Σ, there exists at most one transition
from q with label a.
Example 4.6 We define a function h : NFA1 × Σ
∗ → NFA1 as follows. Let M ∈ NFA1,
M = 〈Q, q0,Σ = {0, 1}, δ : Q×Σ→ Q,F ⊆ Q〉, and x ∈ Σ
∗. Suppose x = a0a1 · · · ak where
ai ∈ Σ. Applying the automata M on x, one of the three following cases may happen:
1. The automata M could read all a0, a1 · · · , ak successfully and stops in an accepting
state. Then we let h(M,x) =M .
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2. The automata M could read all a0, a1 · · · , ak successfully and stops in a state p which
is not an accepting state. If the automata M can transit from p to an accepting
state by reading one alphabet, then we define h(M,x) = M . If it cannot transit (to
an accepting state) then we define h(M,x) to be a new automata M ′ = 〈Q, q′0,Σ =
{0, 1}, δ′ : Q′ × Σ→ Q′, F ′ ⊆ Q′〉, where Q′ = Q, δ′ = δ, F ′ = F ∪ {p}.
3. The automata M cannot read all a0, a1 · · · , ak successfully,and after reading a part of
x, say a0a1 · · · ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ k, it crashes in a state q that δ(q, ai+1) is not defined. In this
case, we let h(M,x) be a new automata M ′ = 〈Q, q′0,Σ = {0, 1}, δ
′ : Q′×Σ→ Q′, F ′ ⊆
Q′〉, where Q′ = Q∪{si+1, si+2, · · · , sk} (all si+1, si+2, · · · , sk are different states that
does not belong to Q), δ′ = δ ∪ {(q, ai+1, si+1), (si+1, ai+2, si+2), · · · , (sk−1, ak, sk)},
and F ′ = F ∪ {sk}.
For each M ∈ NFA1, we let TM be a Turing machine that for each input x ∈ Σ
∗, the
machine TM first constructs the automata h(M,x), and if h(M,x) accepts x, then TM
outputs 1, else it outputs 0.
We define the persistently evolutionary Turing machine PT1 = 〈⌊TM0⌋, f〉, where M
0 =
〈Q0 = {q0}, q0,Σ = {0, 1}, δ
0 = ∅, F 0 = ∅〉, and f(⌊TM⌋, x) = ⌊Th(M,x)⌋.
A language which is intended by a persistently evolutionary Turing machine is an un-
finished object (similar to Brouwer’s choice sequences). At each stage of time, only a finite
part of it, is recognized with the human being who intends the language. Persistently
evolutionary Turing machines exist in time and are temporal dynamic mental construc-
tions (see page 16 of [7]). Also a language intended by a persistently evolutionary Turing
machine is user-dependent. Two users with two persistently evolutionary Turing machines
N1 and N2 with the same initial structure may intend two different languages. A language
which is defined through a persistently evolutionary Turing machine is not predetermined
and is dependent to the free will of the user.
The initial structure N = (z0, f) of a persistently evolutionary Turing machine is con-
structed at a particular moment of time, and then evolves as the user chooses further strings
to input. For persistently evolutionary Turing machines what remains invariant is the char-
acter of the machine as a evolutionary machine, an evolution that started at a particular
point in time and preserves well-definedness. The machine evolves but it is the same ma-
chine that evolves and the machine is an individual unfinished object. Note that the user
is not allowed to reset the machine and goes back to past. It is because that the evolution
is a characteristic of persistently evolutionary Turing machines.
Definition 4.7
We say a persistently evolutionary Turing machine N = (〈z0, z1, ..., zn〉, f) evolves in
a feasible time whenever the function f can be computed in polynomial time.
We say a persistently evolutionary Turing machine N = (〈z0, z1, ..., zn〉, f) works in
polynomial time, whenever there exists a polynomial function p, such that for every x ∈
Σ∗, if we input x to N , the machine zi provides the outputs in less than p(|x|) times,
and the function f constructs the function zi+1 = f(zi, x) in less than p(|x|+ |zi|).
Proposition 4.8 The persistent evolutionary Turing machine PT1 works in polynomial
time.
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Proof. It is straightforward. ⊣
4.1 Physical Plausibility
Hypercomputation extends the capabilities of Turing computation via using new resources
such as 1- infinite memory, 2- infinite specification, 3- infinite computation and 4- the in-
teraction (see the appendix 9.2). Among these four resources, the resources 1,2, and 3
do not seem physically plausible as they have infinite structures. But the forth one, the
interaction, seems physically plausible for the human being. The human being interacts
with its environment and it could be possible that its environment persistently evolve be-
cause of interaction. The persistently evolutionary Turing machines use two resources to be
Hypercomputations 1- evolution, and 2- interaction. Both of these two resources could be
accepted by the human being as physically plausible resources (Biological structures evolve
in Darwin theory). One may hesitate to accept that Persistently evolutionary Turing ma-
chines are physically plausible due to his presupposition that the real world is a Turing
machine, but if he releases himself from this confinement then it seems to him that per-
sistently evolutionary Turing machines are as physically plausible as Turing machines are.
One can implement a persistently evolutionary Turing machine on his personal computer
(assuming that the computer has an infinite memory. Note that the same assumption is
needed for executing Turing machines on a computer). The difference between Turing ma-
chines and persistently evolutionary Turing machines is that the languages that the first
category recognize are predetermined, whereas in the second category, we can recognize an
unfinished and not predetermined language that depends on our interactions.
Therefore, we may list the following items for why persistently evolutionary Turing
machines are physically plausible:
1- The persistently evolutionary Turing computation is a kind of interactive computa-
tion [17] which today is accepted as a new paradigm of computation by some computer
scientist.
2- The persistently evolutionary Turing machines are as plausible as Turing machines
are. Both machines can be simulated by a personal computer (assuming that the
computer has an infinite memory).
3- In Brouwer’s intuitionism, choice sequences are accepted as constructive mathematical
objects. Choice sequences are growing, unfinished objects. Therefore, the persistently
evolutionary Turing machines as growing unfinished objects are acceptable as con-
structive mathematical objects in Brouwer’s intuitionism.
4.2 Persistent Evolution
Suppose B to be an input-output black box. For the observer who does not have access to
the inner structure of the black box, it is not possible to get aware that whether the inner
structure of the black box persistently evolves or not. We only sense a change whenever we
discover that an event which has been sensed before is not going to be sensed similar to
past. Persistently evolution always respects the past. As soon as, an agent experiences an
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event then whenever in future he examines the same event, he will experience it similar to
past. However, persistent evolution effects the future which has not been predetermined,
and not experienced by the agent yet. Therefore,
it is not possible for an agent to distinguish between persistent evolution and
being static based on the history of his observation.
4.3 Free Will
Suppose N = (z0, f) is a persistently evolutionary Turing machine. The machine N could
evolve in different ways due to the free will of the user who chooses freely strings to input to
N . For example, consider the persistently evolutionary Turing machine PT1. If you input
two strings 111, and 11 respectively, the machine PT1 outputs 1 for the first input and
outputs 0 for the second one. Inputting the string 111 made the machine to evolve such
that it cannot accept 11 anymore. The time has sink back to past, and the machine PT1
evolved.
However, you had the free will to input first 11 and then 111, and if this case had
happened, the machine would have accepted both of them!
The user of a persistently evolutionary Turing machine cannot change the past by his free
will, but he can effect the future by his free choices. As soon as a persistently evolutionary
Turing machine evolves, it has been evolved, and it is not possible to go back to past. When
a persistently evolutionary machine evolves, it is the same machine that evolves, and the
evolution is a part of the entity of the machine.
However, since the user has the free will, he can effect the future. The future is not
necessary predetermined, and the user can make lots of different futures due to his free will.
For example, let L be the set of all strings that the evolutionary machine PT1, during the
interaction with a user (with me), outputs 1 for them. The language L is not predetermined,
and it is a growing and an unfinished object (similar to choice sequences 9.2). Consider the
formula
φ := (∃k ∈ N)(∀n > k)(∃x ∈ Σ∗)(|x| = n ∧ x ∈ L).
At each stage of time, having evidence for the truth of formula φ conflicts with the free will
of the user, and we never could have evidence for truth of φ. It is because at each stage of
time, only for a finite number of strings in Σ∗, it is predetermined that whether they are
in L or not. Let m ∈ N be such that m would be grater than the length of all strings that
until now are determined to be in L. The user via his free will can input all strings with
length m+1 to the machine PT1 respectively. The machine PT1 outputs 1 for all of them,
and evolves such that L ∩ {x ∈ Σ∗ | |x| = m} would be empty! Also, at each stage of time
having evidence for ¬φ conflicts with the free will of the computist. Again, let m ∈ N be
such that m would be grater than the length of all strings that until now are determined to
be in L. The user via his free will can input a string with length m to the machine PT1.
The machine PT1 outputs 1 for it.
Theorem 4.9 Let L ⊆ Σ∗ be the growing language intended by a user through the persis-
tently evolutionary Turing machine PT1. let
φ := (∃k ∈ N)(∀n > k)(∃x ∈ Σ∗)(|x| = n ∧ x ∈ L).
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We can never have evidence not for ϕ and not for ¬ϕ, if we assume that the user has the
free will.
Proof. See the above argument. ⊣
5 A Persistently Evolutionary Computation Environment
As we discussed in Section 2, we do not assume Turing machines as autonomous and inde-
pendent entities. The meaning of a Turing machine is subject to the interaction between the
computist (the human being), and the universal processor (human’s brain, or the nature).
Therefore, if the universal processor changes then the meanings of Turing machines change
(although their syntax remain unchanged). We may start an argument by asking a question
Question 5.1 What about if the human’s brain or the nature persistently evolve in the
course that a computation is executed?
In this section, we propose a computation environment, denoted by Ee = (Ue, Of ), which
its universal processor Ue persistently evolves, and its computist Of has the free will. The
computation environment Ee = (Ue, Of ) is such that PEe is not equal to NPEe in it, for the
computist who has the free will.
Definition 5.2 The universal processor Ue = (TBOXe, SBOXe, INSTe, CONFe) is de-
fined as follows.
Two sets INSTe and CONFe are defined to be the same INSTs and CONFs in the
Turing computation environment (see example 3.4) respectively, and consequently the
set of procedures of the universal processor Ue, i.e., Ξe is the same Ξs.
The transition box TBOXe is also defined similar to the transition box TBOXs of the
Turing computation environment ET (see example 3.4).
The successful box SBOXe is defined as follows: let C ∈ CONFe be arbitrary
– if C = (h,△x) then SBOXs(C) = Y ES,
– if C = (h, x△) then the SBOXe works exactly similar to the way that the per-
sistently evolutionary Turing machine PT1 (introduced in example 4.6) performs
on input x, and if PT1 outputs 1, the successful box outputs Y ES, and
– otherwise SBOXe(C) = NO.
Note that the successful box of the universal processor Ue is a persistently evolutionary
Turing machine. For the computist Of the set of syntax-procedures (algorithms) in the
environment Ee is the same set of syntax-procedures in the environment ET . However the
semantics of a syntax-procedure in the environment Ee may be different from its semantics
in the environment ET .
In the computation environment Ee = (Ue, Of ), the syntax-procedures in Ξe satisfy the
four criteria that Copeland gives that any set of instruction that makes up an algorithm
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should satisfy to be characterized as an effective procedure (see the Church-Turing Thesis,
Chapter 2, page 21, [31]). The only thing that one should pay attention is that: the
meaning of procedures may persistently change in the environment for the computist Of .
But it does not mean that they are unambiguous for the computist. The computist does
not have access to the universal processor, and is not aware of the persistent evolution. The
computist using a pencil and paper, writes a configuration on the paper, then using the
universal processor (that could be its brain, and the computist ignores its processes) writes
the computation path on the paper, and what happens inside the universal processor is
ignored by the computist. Also note that
the universal processor Ue is a physically plausible engine (see 4.1), and it could
be assumed as an alternative for the universal processor of the real world.
Theorem 5.3 (GV). Every recursively enumerable language can be recognized in the en-
vironment Ee. That is, for every recursively enumerable language L, there exists M ∈ Ξe
such that L = L(M).
Proof. It is straightforward. For each Turing machine T , one may construct a syntax-
procedure M ∈ Ξe such that L(T ) = L(M), and it is not possible for the computist to
obtain any configurations (h, y△), y ∈ Σ∗, using the procedure M . Then the universal
processor Ue behaves exactly similar to the universal processor Us for the procedure M . ⊣
Corollary 5.4 (GV). The computation environment Ee = (Ue, Of ) is enough powerful
(see definition 3.8).
Proposition 5.5 (GV). The complexity class P is a subset of PEe .
Proof. It is straightforward.⊣
The converse of Theorems 5.3, and 5.5 do not hold true. The computist can effectively
define some languages in polynomial time which are unfinished and not predetermined (see
the proof of theorem 5.8).
Definition 5.6 Let φ be a statement about the syntax-procedures in Ξe. We say the truth
of φ is consistent with the free will of the computist, whenever independent of any way that
the computist interacts with the universal processor, the statement φ always holds true in
the environment.
Any formula that forces the future to be predetermined could conflict with the free will
of the computist (also see 4.3). In following, we prove that PEe = NPEe conflicts with the
free will of the computist.
The item c2 of definition 3.3, considerers the free will as a characteristic of any computist
who lives in a computation environment, therefore, if a formula conflicts with the free will,
then from the god’s view, the formula would not be valid for the computation environment.
Definition 5.7 We say a function f : N → N is sub-exponential, whenever there exists
t ∈ N such that for all n > t, f(n) < 2n.
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Theorem 5.8 (GV). There exists a syntax-procedure M ∈ Ξe such that
• the language L(M) that the computist Of effectively defines (effectively intends) through
M belongs to the class PEe , and
• there exists no syntax-procedure M ′ ∈ Ξe, such that the language that the computist
defines through M ′, i.e., L(M ′), is equal to L′ = {x ∈ Σ∗ | ∃y(|y| = |x| ∧ y ∈ L(M))},
and for some k ∈ N, for all x ∈ L(M ′), if |x| > k then
timeM (x) ≤ f(|x|)
where f : N→ N is a sub-exponential function.
Proof. Consider the following syntax-procedure M ∈ Ξe
Σ = {0, 1},Γ = {0, 1,△},
M = {[(q0,△)→ (h,△, R)], [(h, 0) → (h, 0, R)], [(h, 1) → (h, 1, R)]}.
The intension of the word M is persistently evolutionary in the computation environment
(Ue, Of ) for the computist Of . That is, as the computist chooses a string x ∈ Σ
∗ to
check whether x is an element of L(M), the intension of M persistently changes in the
environment, though since the computist does not have access to the inner structure of the
universal processor Ue, he never gets aware of changes.
The language L(M) is intended deterministically through the syntax-procedure
M by the computist Of , but it is not a predetermined language.
It is obvious that the language that the computist Of intends by the syntax-procedure
M , i.e., L(M) belongs to PEe (due to definition of time complexity in definition 3.3).
Let L′ = {x ∈ Σ∗ | ∃y(|y| = |x| ∧ y ∈ L(M))}. It is again obvious that L′ belongs to
NPEe .
Suppose there exists a syntax-procedure M ′ ∈ Ξe that the computist can intends L
′ by
M ′ in time complexity less than a sub-exponential function f . Then for some k ∈ N, for all
x with length greater than k, x belongs to L′ whenever
the computist constructs a successful computation path C0,xC1,x, ..., Cn,x of the syntax-
procedure M ′ on x, for some n ≤ f(|x|).
Let m1 ∈ N be the maximum length of those strings y ∈ Σ
∗ that until now are accepted
by the persistently evolutionary Turing machine PT1 available in the successful box of Ue.
Define m = max(m1, k).
For every y ∈ Σ∗, let path(y) := C0,yC1,y, ..., Cf(|y|),y be the computational path of
syntax-procedure M ′ on the string y. The path(y) can be generated by the transition
box of Ue. Note that TBOXe is a static machine and does not evolve, thus path(y) is
independent of the behavior of the computist. Let
S(w) = {Cj,y | Cj,y ∈ path(y) ∧ ∃x ∈ Σ
∗(Ci,y = (h, x△))}
and
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H(y) = {x ∈ Σ∗ | ∃Cj,y ∈ path(y)(Cj,y = (h, x△))}
We refer by |H(y)| to the number of elements of H(y), we have |H(y)| ≤ f(|y|) if |y| > k.
Also let E(y) = H(y) ∩ {x ∈ Σ∗ | |x| = |y|}, and D(y) = H(y) ∩ {x ∈ Σ∗ | |x| = |y|+ 2}.
Consider w ∈ Σ∗ with |w| > m. Two cases are possible: either S(w) = ∅ or it is
inhabited.
Consider the first case. S(w) = ∅.
The computist chooses a string w ∈ Σ∗ with length greater than m and applies the
universal processor Ue on the syntax-procedureM
′ and the string w, and recognizes whether
w is in L(M ′) or not. since the set S(w) is empty, the execution of M ′ on w does not make
the SBOXe to evolve, and it remains unchanged.
If the computist realizes that w ∈ L(M ′) then it means that there exists a string v ∈ Σ∗
such that |v| = |w| and v ∈ L(M). But length v is greater than m, and it contradicts with
free will of the computist that he can apply the universal processor in any arbitrary orders
on instructions and configurations (see c2 of definition 3.3). Since the computist has the
free will, he can apply the universal processor Ue on the syntax-procedureM and all strings
in Σ∗ with length |v| + 1 sequentially. As the length of v is greater than m, all strings
with length |v| + 1 are accepted by the persistently evolutionary Turing machine PT1 (see
item-3 of example 4.6) available in SBOXe, and the universal processor evolves. Now if
the computist applies the universal processor on the syntax-procedure M and the string
v, then v cannot be an element of L(M) (see the item-2 of example 4.6) and v 6∈ L(M),
contradiction.
If the computist realizes that w 6∈ L(M ′) then it means that for all strings v ∈ Σ∗,
|v| = |w|, we have v 6∈ L(M). But it contradicts with the free will of the computist again.
As the length w is greater than m, the computist may choose a string z with |z| = |w| and
by the item-3 of example 4.6, we have z ∈ L(M), contradiction.
Consider the second case. S(w) 6= ∅.
Suppose that before computing M ′ on w, the computist applies the universal processor
on the syntax-procedureM and all strings v0’s, for v ∈ E(w), and then applies the universal
processor on the syntax-procedure M and strings v0’s, for v ∈ D(w) respectively. Since
|w| > m, the computist would have v0 ∈ L(M) for all v ∈ E(w) ∪D(w), and the successful
box of the universal processor Ue evolves through computing M on v0’s.
After that, the computist applies the universal processor on M ′ and w. The universal
processor already evolved in the way that the successful box outputs No for all configuration
in {Ci,w ∈ S(w) | ∃x ∈ E(w) ∪ D(w)(Ci,w = (h, x△))}. Either the computist finds w ∈
L(M ′) or w 6∈ L(M ′). Suppose the first case happens and w ∈ L(M ′). It contradicts with
the free will of the computist. The computist can apply the universal processor on M and
strings v0, |v| = |w| sequentially, and would make {v0 ∈ Σ∗ | |v| = |w|} ⊆ L(M). Then
the successful box evolves in the way that, it will output No for all configurations (h, v△),
|v| = |w|, and thus there would exist no v ∈ L(M) ∩ {x ∈ Σ∗ | |x| = |w|}.
Suppose the second case happens and w 6∈ L(M ′). Since |H(w)| < f(|w|) < 2|w|, during
the computation of M ′ on w, only f(|w|) numbers of configurations of the form (h, x△),
x ∈ {v0 | |v| = |w|} ∪ {v1 | |v| = |w|} are given as input to the successful box. Therefore
there exists a string z ∈ {x ∈ Σ∗ | |x| = |w|} such that none of its successors have been
input to the persistently evolutionary Turing machine PT1, and if the computist chooses z
and computes M on it, then z ∈ L(M). Contradiction. ⊣
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Note that the proof of Theorem 5.8 cannot be carried by the computist Of who lives
in the environment. The above proof is done by the god, the ideal mathematician who has
access to the inner structure of the universal processor.
Theorem 5.9 (GV). Free Will 5.
NPEe 6= PEe.
Proof. It is a consequence of theorem 5.8. ⊣
The above theorem says that there exists a syntax-procedure M ∈ Ξe that the com-
putist Of can effectively define the language L(M) in polynomial time through the syntax-
procedure M , such that for L′ = {x ∈ Σ∗ | ∃y(|y| = |x| ∧ y ∈ L(M))}, if L′ can be
effectively defined through a syntax-procedure M ′ ∈ Ξe then it forces the computist to
use the universal processor in some certain orders, which conflicts with the free will of the
computist 6.
Corollary 5.10 The computation environment Ee = (Ue, Of ) is a mathematical model for
the Copeland’s criteria of effective procedures. Thus,
one cannot derive P = NP from the criteria introduced by Copeland for effective
procedures.
Corollary 5.11 There exists a physically plausible and enough powerful computation en-
vironment which P is not equal to NP in.
Proof. Persistently evolutionary Turing machines seem as physically plausible as Turing
machines are. The structure of the transition box of the universal processor Ue is a Turing
machine and the structure of its successful box is a Persistently evolutionary Turing machine.
Therefore Ee = (Ue, Of ) is a physically plausible computation environment. Also Ee is
enough powerful by Theorem 5.3. ⊣
5.1 Complexity Equivalence
In this part, we define an equivalency between universal processors from time complexity
view. We prove that the universal processor Us of Turing computation environment ET is
polynomial time equivalent to the universal processor Ue of the persistently evolutionary
computation environment Ee.
Definition 5.12 Let U1 = (TBOX1, SBOX1, INSTs, CONFs), and
U2 = (TBOX2, SBOX2, INSTs, CONFs) be two universal processors where their in-
structions and configurations are the same instructions and configurations of the Turing
computation environment ET . Also let f : N → N be a function. We say two universal
processor U1 and U2 are f -complexity equivalent whenever:
5Readers may see [4], where the notion of the free will is used to settle the well-known Surprise Exam
Paradox. The notion of the free will is also discussed in author’s PhD thesis [26], and in [3].
6Note that the above argument says that if the language of a syntax-procedure M is not predetermined
and the computist who computes the language through M has free will, then future is always undetermined
and any assumption that forces the future to be determined conflicts with the free will. The statement
P = NP is one of those assumptions that forces the future behavior of the computist to be determined.
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1- for each C = (q, xay) ∈ CONFs, and each ι ∈ INSTs, if TBOX1(C, ι) = C
′ for
some C ′ ∈ CONFs, then there exist τ1, τ2, ..., τk ∈ INSTs, for some k ≤ f(|xay|),
such that for some C1, C2, ..., Ck ∈ CONFs, TBOX2(C, ι1) = C1, for all 2 ≤ i ≤ k,
TBOX2(Ci−1, ιi−1) = Ci and Ck = C
′.
2- for each C = (q, xay) ∈ CONFs, and each ι ∈ INSTs, if TBOX2(C, ι) = C
′ for
some C ′ ∈ CONFs, then there exist τ1, τ2, ..., τk ∈ INSTs, for some k ≤ f(|xay|),
such that for some C1, C2, ..., Ck ∈ CONFs, TBOX1(C, ι1) = C1, for all 2 ≤ i ≤ k,
TBOX1(Ci−1, ιi−1) = Ci and Ck = C
′.
3- for each C = (q, xay) ∈ CONFs, if SBOX1(C) = Y ES, then there exist τ1, τ2, ..., τk ∈
INSTs, for some k ≤ f(|xay|) such that for some C1, C2, ..., Ck ∈ CONFs, TBOX2(C, ι1) =
C1, for all 2 ≤ i ≤ k, TBOX2(Ci−1, ιi−1) = Ci and SBOX2(Ck) = Y ES.
4- for each C = (q, xay) ∈ CONFs, if SBOX2(C) = Y ES, then there exist τ1, τ2, ..., τk ∈
INSTs, for some k ≤ f(|xay|), such that for some C1, C2, ..., Ck ∈ CONFs, TBOX1(C, ι1) =
C1, for all 2 ≤ i ≤ k, TBOX1(Ci−1, ιi−1) = Ci and SBOX1(Ck) = Y ES.
Suppose you, as a computist, have two personal computer on your desk. The CPU of
one of them is the universal processor U1, and the CPU of the other one is the universal
processor U2, the programming language that you can communicate with the processor are
the same, and you know that
- if you can transit from a configuration C = (q, xay) and an instruction ι to a con-
figuration C ′ using the transition box TBOX1 (TBOX2) only one time, then you
can transit from the same configuration C to the same configuration C ′ using the
transition box TBOX2 (TBOX1) at most f(|xay|) times, and
- if you input a configuration C = (q, xay) to the SBOX1 (SBOX2), and receives
Y ES, then you can transit from the configuration C to a configuration C ′ using the
transition box TBOX2 (TBOX1) at most f(|xay|) times, such that the successful box
SBOX2 (SBOX1) outputs Y ES for C
′.
Then, for you as a computist, it seems (wrongly) that if you can do some work using the
processor U1 in m times, then you may do the same work using the processor U2 for at most
2m× f(m) times, and vice versa.
Proposition 5.13 Two universal processors Us and Ue are f -complexity equivalent where
f(n) = 2n for all n ∈ N.
Proof. It is straightforward. ⊣
6 An Axiomatic System for Turing Computability
In this section, we provide an axiomatic system for Turing computation. Let CONF =
CONFs, and INST = INSTs (where CONFs, INSTs are defined in example 3.4. Also
let Ξ be the set of all finite subsets of INST such that for every M ∈ Ξ, for every two
instructions ι1 = [(q1, a1)→ (p1, b1,D1)], ι2 = [(q2, a2)→ (p2, b2,D2)], if ι1, ι2 ∈M , q1 = q2,
and a1 = a2 then p1 = p2, b1 = b2, and D1 = D2. Consider
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a function symbol TB : CONF × INST → CONF ∪ {⊥}, and
a predicate symbol SB : CONF → {Y ES,NO}.
For each x ∈ Σ∗, define C0,x = (q0,△x).
Definition 6.1 For each x ∈ Σ∗, for each M ∈ Ξ, we define
x ∈ L(M) :≡ there exists n ∈ N, there exists τ1, τ2, ..., τn ∈M , there exists C1, C2, ..., Cn ∈
CONF , such that C1 = TB(C0,x, τ1), and Ci = TB(Ci−1, τi) for 1 < i ≤ n, and
SB(Cn) = Y ES, and for all ι ∈M , TB(Cn, ι) =⊥.
timeM (x) = n whenever there exists τ1, τ2, ..., τn ∈ M , there exists C1, C2, ..., Cn ∈
CONF , such that C1 = TB(C0,x, τ1), and Ci = TB(Ci−1, τi) for 1 < i ≤ n, and
SB(Cn) = Y ES, and for all ι ∈M , TB(Cn, ι) =⊥.
An axiomatic system T for Turing computation consists of following axioms A1-A4.
A1. for all x, y ∈ Σ∗, for all a, b1, b2, c ∈ Σ, for all q, p ∈ Q,
TB((q, xb1ab2y), [(q, a)→ (p, c,R)]) = (p, xb1cb2y), and
TB((q, xb1ab2y), [(q, a)→ (p, c, L)]) = (p, xb1cb2y).
A2. If SB(C) = Y ES then for some x ∈ Σ∗, either C = (h,△x) or C = (h, x△).
A3. For all x ∈ Σ∗, if C = (h,△x) then SB(C) = Y ES.
A4. For all x ∈ Σ∗, if C = (h, x△) then SB(C) = Y ES.
Let TM = {T = (Q,Σ,Γ, q0, δ) | Q ⊆ QT } be the set of all Turing machines (see defini-
tion 2.1). Define two functions F1 : TM → Ξ and F2 : Ξ→ TM as follows:
• for each Turing machine T ∈ TM , F1(T ) = δ,
• for each M ∈ Ξ, F2(M) = (Q,Σ,Γ, q0,M), where Q is the set of all states appeared
in the instructions of M .
Theorem 6.2 For each x ∈ Σ∗, for every T ∈ TM , for every M ∈ Ξ,
• x ∈ L(T ) iff T ⊢ x ∈ L(F1(T )).
• timeT (x) = n iff T ⊢ timeF1(T )(x) = n.
• T ⊢ x ∈ L(M) iff x ∈ L(F2(M)).
• T ⊢ timeM (x) = n iff timeF2(M)(x) = n.
Proof. It is straightforward. ⊣
The above theorem declares that the axiomatic system T is an appropriate axiomatiza-
tion of Turing computation.
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Theorem 6.3 Let T ′ be the axiomatic system T − {A4}.
T ′ 6⊢ P = NP.
Proof. We need to provide a model for the theory T ′ such that P is not equal to NP in the
model. Interpret the predicate symbol SB to be the successful box SBOXe of computation
environment Ee, and the function symbol TB to be the transition box TBOXe. All axioms
in T ′ are satisfied by this interpretation. On the other hand, by Theorem 5.9, in this model,
we have P 6= NP. 7 ⊣
7 P vs NP for the Computist
We claim that the computist who lives inside the Turing computation environment ET
can never be confident that whether he lives inside a static environment or a persistently
evolutionary one. It is simply because of the three following facts:
1- The language (syntax) of two computation environments ET and Ee are the same.
That is, INSTe = INSTs, CONFe = CONFs, and Ξe = Ξs.
2- The universal processor of the Turing computation environment is a black box for the
computist. The computist can never know that whether the universal processor of its
environment persistently evolves or not. It is because an observer who doe not have
access to the inner structure of a black box, can never distinguish that whether the
black box persistently evolves or not.
3- If the universal processor of an environment persistently evolves, then it is possible
that there are syntax-procedures in Ξ which their languages are not predetermined
and P = NP conflicts with the free will of the computist. For example, P is not equal
to NP in the computation environment Ee.
In follows, we show that for the computist who lives in one of the environments ET
or Ee, it is not possible to get aware that actually he lives in a static environment or a
persistently evolutionary one.
Definition 7.1 (BLACK BOX). Let X and Y be two sets,
• an input-output black box B, for an observer O, is a box that
– The observer O does not see the inner instruction of the box, and
– the observer O chooses elements in X, and input them to the box, and receives
elements in Y as output.
7Consider axiom
A′2. SB(C) = Y ES if and only if for some x ∈ Σ∗ C = (h,△x).
One may check that Ω = {A1,A′2} is a theory for Turing computability, and for every M ∈ Ξ, for every
x ∈ Σ∗, Γ′ ⊢ x ∈ L(M) iff Ω ⊢ x ∈ L(M), and for every M ∈ Ξ, for every x ∈ Σ∗, for every n ∈ N,
Γ′ ⊢ timeM (x) = n iff Ω ⊢ timeM (x) = n.
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• We say an input-output black box B behaves well-defined for an observer O, whenever
if the observer O inputs x0 to the black box, and the black box outputs y0 at a stage of
time, then whenever in future if the observer O inputs the same x0 again, the black
box outputs the same y0.
• We say a well-defined black box is static (or is not order-sensitive) whenever for all
n ∈ N, for every x1, x2, ..., xn ∈ X, for every permutation σ on {1, 2, ..., n}, if the
observer inputs x1, x2, ..., xn respectively to B once, and receives y1 = Bx1, y2 =
Bx2, ..., yn = Bxn, and then the god (the one who has access to the inner structure
of the black box) resets the inner structure of the black box B, and after reset, the
observer inputs xσ(1), xσ(2), ..., xσ(n) respectively to B, then the outputs of B for each
xi would be the same already output yi.
• An observer who does not have access to the inner structure of a well-defined black
box B, and cannot reset the inner structure black box B, can never get aware whether
the black box is static or order-sensitive.
Example 7.2 Let X = Y = N, and B be the black box that works as follows. I hide in the
black box, and do the following strategy. I plan to output 1 for each n before the observer
gives the black box 5 or 13 as inputs. If the observer gives 5 as input (and has not yet given
13 before) then after that time, I output 2 for all future inputs that have not been already
given to the black box. For those natural numbers that the observer have already given them
as input, I still output the same 1. If the observer gives 13 as input (and has not yet given
5 before) then after that time, I output 3 for all future inputs that have not been already
given to the black box. For those natural numbers that the observer has already given them
as input, I still output the same 1. It is easy to verify that
1- The black box B works well-defined.
2- The black box is order-sensitive.
3- For the observer O, it is not possible to be aware that the black box is order sensitive.
He always could assume that actually a machine Turing is in the black box.
4- The function that the observer computes via the black box B is not a predetermined
function, but the observer can never find out that whether the function is predetermined
or not!
Proposition 7.3
• For every finite sets of pairs S = {(ik, ok) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n, n ∈ N, ik, ok ∈ Σ
∗}, there exists
a Turing machine T such that for all (ik, ok) ∈ S, if we give ik as an input to T , the
Turing machine T outputs ok.
• For every finite sets of pairs S = {(ik, ok) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n, n ∈ N, ik, ok ∈ Σ
∗}, there exists
a Persistent evolutionary Turing machine N such that for all (ik, ok) ∈ S, if we give
ik as an input to N , the Persistent evolutionary machine N outputs ok.
Proof. It is straightforward. ⊣
26
Corollary 7.4 Let B be a an input-output black box for an observer. At each stage of time,
the observer has observed only a finite set of input-output pairs. By the pervious proposition,
at each stage of time, the observer knows both the following cases to be possible:
1- There exists a Turing machine inside the black box B.
2- There exists a Persistent evolutionary Turing machine inside the black Box B.
Fact 7.5 In any computation environment E = (U,O), since the computist O cannot reset
the universal processor and goes back to past, he can never realize that actually he lives in
a static environment or in a persistently evolutionary one.
Therefore, the computist who lives in the Turing computation environment can never
have evidence from his observation that the universal processor which means to syntax-
procedures in Ξs is static or persistently evolutionary.
The following argument can be carried out in Epistemic logic [14].
• There are two possible worlds (two computation environments) ET and Ee that the
computist can never distinguish between them.
• In Epistemic logic an agent knows a formula ϕ whenever the formula ϕ is true in all
possible worlds which are not indistinguishable from the actual world for the agent.
• In the possible world Ee, P 6= NP.
thus,
The computist who lives inside the Turing computation environment ET does not know
P = NP. 8
8 Concluding Remarks
P versus NP is a major difficult problem in computational complexity theory, and it is
shown that lots of certain techniques of complexity theory are failed to answer to this
problem (see [27, 1, 2]). We constructed a computational environments Ee which
1- is physically plausible,
2- is enough powerful, and the computist who lives inside the proposed environment can
carry out logical deductions,
3- similar to the human being who ignores his brain in formalizing notions of computation
and time complexity, the computist of the proposed environment does not have access
to the inner structure and internal actions of the universal processor,
4- the universal processor of the computation persistently evolve in a feasible time, and
5- P is not equal to NP in the proposed environment.
8A formal version of this argument is presented in the next paper “Computation Environment (2)”.
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It seems that the above five items make it possible to know the proposed computation en-
vironment as an alternative for the computation environment which surrounded the human
being.
This paper is a first manuscript of some serial articles which would be appeared sequen-
tially:
1- A Persistent Evolutionary Semantics for Predicate Logic. In (classic) model theory,
the mathematician who studies a structure is assumed as a god who lives out of the
structure, and the study of the mathematician does not effect the structure. Against
of this, we will propose a new semantics, called persistently evolutionary semantics, for
predicate logic that the meaning of functions and predicates symbols are not already
predetermined, and predicate and function symbols find their meaning through the
interaction of the subject with the language. Then, we will prove formally that the
computist who lives inside the Turing computation environment can never know P =
NP .
2- We will discuss the human being as a computist of its computation environment. Lots
of people do not agree with us that one is allowed to distinguish between syntax and
semantics of Turing machines. Although, we proposed an interactive semantics for
computation and prove that P is not equal to NP in this semantics, but one may
note that the computist who lives inside the computation environment Ee does not
distinguish between the syntax and semantics of procedures in Ξe (since the com-
putist ignores the inner structure of the universal processor, and cannot be aware
that whether he lives in a static environment or a persistently evolutionary one).
Therefore, we will discuss that
– it is possible that the human being lives in an interactive environment (like the
environment Ee),
– the human being does not distinguish between the syntax and semantics of Turing
machines (similar to the computist who lives inside Ee), and
– the human being, even by considering that the semantics and syntax to be the
same, cannot prove P = NP.
3- There are lots of open problems in sciences. One of the main reason that why P vs NP
is so famous, is because of the foundation of cryptography. We proved that P 6= NP
for interactive computation. Interactive computation is physically plausible and could
be considered as a new paradigm in computer science. We will propose an interactive
cryptosystem and to show that it is safe, we reduce our interactive P 6= NP statement
to it.
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9 Appendix A.
In the appendix, a very short review of hypercomputations and an introduction of Brouwer’s
intuitionism is presented. To review the Hypercomputation resources, the section 4 of [25]
is used, and the review of Brouwer’s choice sequences is derived from [9].
9.1 Hypercomputation
In what follows, we briefly review a collection of hypercomputational resources and those
hypermachines that use these resources.
Non-recursive Information Sources.
The paradigm hypercomputation starts with the o-machine, proposed by Turing in
1939 [33]. O-machine is a Turing machine equipped with an oracle that is capable of
answering questions about the membership of a specific set of natural numbers. If the
oracle set is recursive then the o-machine gains no new power, but if the oracle set is
not itself computable by Turing machines, the o-machine may compute an infinite number
of non-recursive functions. The o-machines use non-recursive information sources [25] as
hypercomputational resources [25].
Coupled Turing machine, introduced by Copeland and Sylvan [13], is a Turing machine
with one or more input channels, providing input to the machine while the computation
is in progress. The specific sequence of input determines the functions that the coupled
Turing machine can perform. It exceeds a Turing machine if the sequence of input is non-
recursive. Like o-machines, coupled Turing machines use non-recursive information sources.
Besides the above discussed hypermachines, Asynchronous network of Turing machines [13],
Error prone Turing machines [25], and Probabilistic Turing machines [22] are well-known
hypermachines that all use non-recursive information sources as their hypercomputation
resources.
Infinite Memory.
Another way to expand the capabilities of a Turing machine is to allow it to begin
with infinite number of symbols initially inscribed on its tape. Turing machines with initial
inscription which have an explicitly infinite amount of storage space are not physically
plausible.
Infinite Specification.
An infinite state Turing machine is a Turing machine where the set of states is allowed
to be infinite. This type of machine has an infinite amount of transitions, with only a
finite number of transition from a given state. This gives the Turing machine an infinite
program of which only a finite (but unbounded) amount of transitions is used in any given
computation. The infinite state Turning machines require infinite specification which does
not seems physically plausible.
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Infinite Computation.
In the last century, Bertrand Russell [28], Ralph Blake [10], and Hermann Weyl [34]
independently proposed the idea of a process that performs its step in one unit of time and
each subsequent step in half the time of the step before [25]. Therefore, such a process could
complete an infinity of steps in two time unit. The application of this temporal patterning
to Turing machines has been discussed briefly by Ian Stewart [30] and in much more depth
by Copeland [12] under the name of accelerated Turing machines. The hypercomputation
resource is infinite computation. To achieve infinite computation through acceleration, we
rapidly run into conflict with physics. For the tape head to get faster and faster, its speed
converges to infinite.
Joel Hamkins and Andy Lewis presented another kind of hypermachines that use infinite
computation [20], named infinite time Turing machines. The infinite time Turing machine
is a natural extension of Turing machine to transfinite ordinal times, the machine would
be able to operate for transfinite numbers of steps. An interesting case about infinite time
Turing machines is that it has been proved P 6= NP for this model of computation [29].
Interaction.
Among other resources: non-recursive information sources, infinite memory, infinite
specification, and infinite computation, the interaction seems to be possible with our current
physics. Persistently evolutionary Turing machines which are introduced in this paper, use
the interaction as a Hypercomputation resource.
A kind of hypermachines that use the interaction as resource is the class of persistent
Turing machines (PTMs), multiple machines with a persistent worktape preserved between
interactions, independently introduced by Goldin and Wegner [18] and Kosub [21]. Consis-
tent PTMs, a subclass of PTMs, produce the same output string for a given input string ev-
erywhere within a single interaction stream; different interaction streams may have different
outputs for the same input. PTMs are a minimal extension of Turing machines that express
interactive behavior. The behavior of a PTM is characterized by input-output streams in-
stead of input-output strings. Interaction streams have the form (i1, o1), (i2, o2), ..., where
i’s are input strings and o’s are output strings by PTM. For all k, ok is computed from ik but
preceded and can influence ik+1. The set of all interaction streams for a PTMM consists its
language, L(M), and two PTMsM1 andM2 are equivalent if and only if L(M1) = L(M2).
Actually, PTMs extend computing to computable nonfunctions over histories rather than
noncomputable functions over strings, whereas persistently evolutionary Turing machines
(introduced in this paper) extends computing to interactive computable functions which
are not predetermined.
9.2 Intuitionism
Over the last hundred years, certain mathematicians have tried to rebuilt mathematics on
constructivist principles [32]. However, there are considerable differences between various
representatives of constructivist, and there exists no explicit unique answer to what a con-
structive object or a constructive method is. In contrast to other constructivist schools
as Bishop’s and Markov’s [11], for Brouwer, the notion of “constructive object” is not re-
stricted to have a numerical meaning, or to be presented as ‘words’ in some finite alphabet
of symbols [32]. According to Brouwer, mathematical objects are mental constructions, a
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languageless activity and independent of logic. Brouwer recognized the choice sequences as
legitimate mathematical objects [32].
Imagine you have a collection of objects at your disposal, let’s say the natural numbers.
Pick out one of them, and note the result. Put it back into the collection, and choose again.
Since you have the ability to choose freely, you may choose a different one, or the same
again. Record the result, and put it back. You may make further choices and keeping on.
A choice sequence is what you get if you think of the sequence you are making as potentially
infinite [9]. Initial segments are always finite. We cannot make an actually infinite number
of choices, but we can always extend an initial segment by making a further choice. The
following characteristic of the choice sequences is crucial in our consideration:
The subject successively chooses objects, restriction on future choices, restriction on restriction
of future choices, etc. ([8] page 6)
The object of classical mathematics have their properties independently from us and are
static. Choice sequences, in contrast, depends on the subject (who has to make the choice),
and they change through time. They are individual dynamic objects that come into being,
at the moment that the subject decides to intend them, and with each further choice, they
grow, and they are not necessarily predetermined by some law.
static-dynamic An object is static exactly if at no moments parts are added to it, or removed
from it. It is dynamic exactly if at some moment parts are added to it, or removed from
it. ([6], page 12)
Since choice sequences are dynamic objects and are accepted as intuitionistic mathe-
matical objects, the notion of “constructive method” cannot be captured by Turing com-
putability. In addition, in intuitionism, the notion of decidability differs from the notion
of recursiveness. Although any recursive set is decidable, the converse is not true. From
intuitionistic view, a subset A of N, is decidable if and only if there exists a sequence α ∈ 2N,
such that, for every n, n ∈ A if and only if α(n) = 1 [3]. It is not required that the sequence
α is given by a finite algorithm, it can be a choice sequence.
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